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Abstract
Background: Continuous deep sedation at the end of life is a practice that has been the topic of considerable
ethical debate, for example surrounding its perceived similarity or dissimilarity with physician-assisted dying. The
practice is generally considered to be legal as a form of symptom control, although this is mostly only assumed.
France has passed an amendment to the Public Health Act that would grant certain terminally ill patients an
explicit right to continuous deep sedation until they pass away. Such a framework would be unique in the world.
Discussion: In this paper we will highlight and reflect on four relevant aspects and shortcomings of the proposed
bill. First, that the bill suggests that continuous deeps sedation should be considered as a sui generis practice.
Second, that it requires that sedation should always be accompanied by the withholding of all artificial nutrition
and hydration. In the most recently amended version of the legal proposal it is stated that life sustaining
treatments are withheld unless the patient objects. Third, that the French bill would not require that the suffering
for which continuous deep sedation is initiated is unbearable. Fourth, the question as to whether the proposal
should be considered as a way to avoid having to decriminalise euthanasia and/or PAS or, on the contrary, as a
veiled way to decriminalise these practices.
Summary: The French proposal to amend the Public Health Act to include a right to continuous deep sedation for
some patients is a unique opportunity to clarify the legality of continuous deep sedation as an end-of-life practice.
Moreover, it would recognize that the practice of continuous deep sedation raises ethical and legal issues that are
different from those raised by symptom control on the one hand and assisted dying on the other hand.
Nevertheless, there are still various issues of significant ethical concern in the French legislative proposal.
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Background
Introduction
Continuous deep sedation at the end of life (CDS) is the
practice whereby a physician uses sedative medication
resulting in the reduction or elimination of a patient’s
consciousness until she dies. This practice is the topic of
considerable ethical debate [1–3]. Part of the
controversy surrounding continuous sedation is related
to its perceived similarity or dissimilarity to euthanasia
and/or physician-assisted suicide (PAS) [4]. Some regard
the practice as proper medical care [5] whereas others
see continuous sedation as equivalent to 'slow euthan-
asia' [6]. Most commentators agree that continuous sed-
ation at the end of life can be ethically justified in
particular circumstances.
Currently the debate on sedation is very lively in
France, where an amendment to the Public Health Act
was made to include an explicit right for terminally ill
patients to 'deep and continuous sedation' [7]. This has
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received little attention in the academic literature and in
the international news media, yet it represents a devel-
opment that is highly interesting for various reasons.
First, if France would indeed create an explicit legal right
to obtain continuous deep sedation this would be unique
in the world. Continuous deep sedation is deemed legal
in most countries, but mostly because it is assumed to
be a form of legally allowed symptom control. Second,
various elements of the French legislative proposal
would create a very strict regulatory framework for sed-
ation. For example, there is considerable debate over
whether deep and continuous sedation should always be
accompanied by the withholding or withdrawing of all
life sustaining treatment, including artificial hydration
and nutrition, with the initial proposal stating that it
should always be withheld. Moreover, the proposal
requires health institutions to create a register document-
ing all cases of continuous sedation until death occurring
on their premises. Such a registration has never before
been put into place. Third, it could be claimed that in
some respects the French proposition seeks to legalise
continuous deep sedation so as to avoid having to decrim-
inalise physician-assisted suicide. If true, this would sup-
port the idea that the availability of sedation is sometimes
used as an argument not to decriminalise euthanasia or
physician-assisted suicide [8] or that discussions on con-
tinuous deep sedation distract from important debates on
euthanasia or physician assisted suicide and that we are
thus perhaps 'pulling the sheet over our eyes' [1].
This paper will elaborate on the current ethical and
legal debate in France and on the unique and ground-
breaking nature of the legislative proposal on continuous
sedation. We will highlight and reflect on four ethically
relevant aspects and shortcomings of the bill. First, that
the bill suggests that continuous deep sedation should
be considered as a sui generis practice. Second, that it
requires that sedation should normally be accompanied
by the withholding of all life sustaining treatment.
Whether this also includes artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion is, as will be discussed below, a matter of consider-
able debate. Third, that the French bill would not
require that the suffering for which continuous deep
sedation is initiated is severe or unbearable. Fourth, the
question as to whether the proposal should be consid-
ered as a way to avoid having to decriminalise euthan-
asia and/or PAS or, on the contrary, as a veiled way to
decriminalise these practices.
The legislative developments in France
Patients' rights and end-of-life care in France are regu-
lated by the law of 22 April 2005 [9]—also known as the
Loi Leonetti (Leonetti Law) after the man who originally
proposed the law— which amends the Public Health Act
(Code de la Santé Publique, CSP). This law explicitly
allows physicians to provide far-reaching symptom con-
trol, even at the risk of shortening life, while prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. It has been
suggested that the Loi Leonetti also allows continuous
deep sedation as a form of far-reaching symptom control
[10], although it does not mention the practice.
The end of life remains a topic of legal, political and
ethical debate in France. When running for President in
2012, François Hollande made various commitments,
one of which (commitment 21)1 was to allow terminally
ill patients with unbearable suffering the possibility to
'benefit from medical assistance to end one's life with
dignity'.2 After being elected President, to follow up on
his commitment, François Hollande entrusted Professor
Didier Sicard, a physician specialised in internal medi-
cine and a former Chair of the National Advisory
Committee on Ethics, with a mission to examine the
need to rethink the French legal framework on end-of-
life care. This mission resulted in a report (known as the
Sicard report) which stated that the Loi Leonetti already
allowed many practices such as continuous deep sed-
ation, but that this was generally unknown [11]. The
same report condemned the practice of euthanasia,
while remaining ambiguous on physician-assisted sui-
cide. It was concluded that a proper use of the Loi
Leonetti could address most requests for life-ending.
Following the Sicard Report, on 21 January 2015, Alain
Claeys and Jean Leonetti submitted a legislative proposal
to France's National Assembly (i.e., the House of
Representatives) to introduce various significant amend-
ments to the existing Loi Leonetti which, 10 years after
its adoption, was deemed to be unclear in some respects.
The proposal was a multi-party proposal, as Claeys is a
deputy from the left wing of the political spectrum,
while Leonetti belongs to the right wing. Particularly
relevant for this paper are two specific changes proposed
by Claeys and Leonetti. The first is the amendment to
include an explicit legal right to continuous deep sed-
ation. They proposed to include the following statement
in the Public Health Act:
At the request of the patient to avoid all suffering and to
not unnecessarily prolong his or her life, a deep and
continuous sedation producing a change in consciousness
that is maintained until death, associated with pain
relief and with the discontinuation of all life-sustaining
treatments, is put into place in the following cases:
1) when the patient, suffering from a serious and
incurable illness, and whose life expectancy is
threatened in the short term, shows treatment
refractory suffering.
2) when the decision of a patient, suffering from a
serious and incurable illness, to stop a treatment,
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threatens his or her life expectancy in the short term
([7], authors’ translation)3
Second, Claeys and Leonetti proposed to include into
the Public Health Act the statement that 'artificial hydra-
tion and nutrition constitute treatment' ([7], authors’
translation).4 This is highly relevant since, combined
with the above amendment, this would mean that all
deep and continuous sedation would have to be accom-
panied by the withholding or withdrawing of all artificial
food and fluids. Moreover, it would also mean that ter-
minally ill patients who refuse artificial hydration and
nutrition could automatically request deep and continu-
ous sedation (see case 2 above).
The proposed amendments have been the topic of
considerable debate in the French National Assembly
and the French Senate. In a first reading, the legislative
proposal was adopted in the National Assembly by a
significant majority on 17 March 2015 (436 votes in
favour, 34 votes against, 83 abstentions). When the text
was subsequently sent to the Senate, unexpectedly, it
received significantly less support. Two important
amendments were made by the Senate. First, an amend-
ment was adopted to replace the sentence stating that
‘artificial hydration and nutrition constitute treatment’
with the following sentence: 'Artificial hydration consti-
tutes care that can be continued until the end of life'.5
Second, an amendment was voted to delete the words
'continuous' and 'maintained until death'. This amend-
ment thus shifted the focus of the bill from the specific
case of continuous deep sedation until death to any form
of deep sedation (e.g., also intermittent deep sedation or
deep sedation that is not maintained until death). As a
result of the disagreement between the National Assem-
bly and the Senate, the legislative proposal was rejected
by the Senate on 23 June 2015 (196 votes against and 87
in favour) and sent back to the National Assembly.
In a second reading of the bill, the National Assembly
ignored the amendments made in the Senate and relied
on the initial proposal to focus the bill on continuous
deep sedation until death and to consider artificial
hydration and nutrition to be treatment. Again, a sig-
nificant majority approved the legislative proposal.
When sent to the Senate for a second reading, the
Senate again amended the proposal to state that arti-
ficial hydration and nutrition constitute care that can
be continued until death. However, this time the Senate
approved the bill with a significant majority (10 votes
against and 287 in favour), after which the proposal
was, in a final stage, discussed in a mixed commission
consisting of members of the Assemblée and the
French Senate.
In this mixed commission several additional amend-
ments were made, and on 27 January 2016 the proposal
became law. The law states that the Public Health
Act should be amended to state that: “Artificial hy-
dration and nutrition constitute treatments that can
be stopped”.6 It also guarantees a right to continuous
deep sedation, as the law also amends the Public
Health Act to state that:
At the request of the patient to avoid all suffering and
to avoid therapeutic obstinacy a deep and continuous
sedation producing a change in consciousness that is
maintained until death, associated with pain relief
and with the discontinuation of all life-sustaining
treatments, is put into place in the following cases:
1) when the patient, suffering from a serious and
incurable illness, and whose life expectancy is
threatened in the short term, shows treatment
refractory suffering.
2) when the decision of a patient, suffering from a
serious and incurable illness, to stop a treatment,
threatens his or her life expectancy in the short term
and causes unbearable suffering ([12], authors’
translation).7
The text that was passed as law is very similar to the
initial proposal by Claeys & Leonetti (quoted above).
Various aspects of the French proposal and the ensu-
ing debates are of particular interest and invite ethical
reflections, to which we now turn.
Discussion
Is continuous deep sedation a sui generis practice and
does it require a separate law?
There is considerable international debate on whether or
not continuous deep sedation is a sui generis practice.
For some, the practice is nothing more than 'slow eu-
thanasia' [6] or 'euthanasia in disguise' [13] and hence
should be considered and regulated as such. Others see
continuous deep sedation as a far reaching form of
symptom control. In a qualitative study into continuous
sedation in the UK, Belgium and The Netherlands, for
example, not a single UK physician or nurse reported
ever using the term 'continuous sedation' or a related
term [14]. One UK nurse was quoted as saying: 'I don’t
usually use the word ‘sedation’, I use the term ‘make him
more comfortable and settled' ([14], p.52). These respon-
dents clearly did not experience continuous sedation as
a practice that differs from other forms of symptom
control.
By discussing a possible legislative framework specific-
ally pertaining to continuous deep sedation, French poli-
ticians are suggesting that continuous deep sedation is a
practice that is clearly and relevantly different from both
symptom control (which was already regulated by the
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Loi Leonetti) and euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide
(which remain illegal in France). In most countries, con-
tinuous deep sedation is currently considered to be le-
gally allowed as a far-reaching form of symptom control.
This legal permissibility is, however, always assumed ra-
ther than argued for, and although many international
guidelines exist on sedation, only the Dutch National
Guideline [15] has explicit legal authority.8 In Belgium,
when the euthanasia law was being debated, the Council
of State advised Parliament to include into the law a sec-
tion to distinguish euthanasia from 'sedative therapy'.
The Council of State argued that the legal status of sed-
ation would otherwise remain uncertain [16]. This
advice was ignored and a chance to settle the issue of
the legality of continuous deep sedation in Belgium was
missed. Meanwhile, uncertainty and confusion persist
concerning the boundaries between continuous deep
sedation and euthanasia [17–19].9
One of the areas of uncertainty regarding continuous
deep sedation has to do with the question as to whether
or not the practice shortens life. Although it is some-
times claimed that the practice does not shorten life
[20], other commentators disagree [21, 22]. Admittedly,
even if it could shorten life, continuous sedation could
still be legally justified, for other types of legally allowed
symptom control (e.g., high doses of analgesics) or treat-
ment limitation could also potentially shorten life. In
such cases, a double effect type of reasoning is often
employed, i.e., the reasoning that, although shortening
life is possible, this is not intended and merely occurs as
a side-effect. This type of reasoning is also often applied
in the case of continuous deep sedation, yet its sound-
ness in this context is questionable [23].
Moreover, even if the practice of CDS would not
shorten life, it does reduce or take away a patient's con-
sciousness until death, which can constitute a serious
harm. In view of this fact, according to some experts in
medical law, the legal permissibility of continuous sed-
ation is not self-evident [24]. France could thus become
the first country in the world to provide explicit legal
clarity in this regard.
Creating a specific legislative framework has the fur-
ther advantage of recognizing that continuous deep sed-
ation raises considerable ethical issues of its own, and
that these issues are different from those raised by symp-
tom control on the one hand and euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide on the other hand. Continuous
deep sedation is often portrayed as 'normal medical
practice', i.e., no different from other practices. Such a
view can serve to obscure and/or minimize some of the
ethical issues relating to CDS [21]. However, as noted by
some commentators, continuous deep sedation at least
involves permanently taking away consciousness, which
is a grave act that can only be justified by proportionally
grave reasons. Patients receiving continuous deep sed-
ation are no longer able to communicate and express
their wishes, and are bereft of all experiences, both posi-
tive and negative. This provides a reason, in our view, to
not automatically consider continuous deep sedation as
normal medical practice and hence justified.
The distinction between continuous deep sedation and
other medical end-of-life practices is also highlighted by
the fact that the initial proposal to amend the Loi
Leonetti required every institution to maintain a register
of all cases of continuous deep sedation, which would
have to respect patient anonymity and, when requested,
could be made available to the Regional Health Agency.
Such a register would be unique and would provide a
possibility to monitor the use of continuous deep sed-
ation in France. In contrast, medical decisions such as
withdrawing life-support and administering high doses
of analgesics would not have to be reported, indicating
that they are perceived differently.
In creating an explicit patient right to continuous deep
sedation, France would thus be one of the first countries
to recognize the practice as a sui generis end-of-life prac-
tice that poses specific problems and thus needs specific
attention. Moreover, in implementing a register, France
would be unique.
Should artificial nutrition and hydration always be
withdrawn or withheld?
In many respects, the French proposal calls to mind rec-
ommendations already made by some international
guidelines [15, 25, 26] (although the content of the vari-
ous guidelines regarding continuous sedation differs sig-
nificantly [27]). Continuous deep sedation would require
a patient request, and could only be used for patients
with a short life expectancy experiencing refractory
symptoms and who have a serious and incurable illness.
In one highly relevant aspect, the French proposal differs
from many guidelines, namely on the issue of artificial
nutrition and hydration (ANH). Not surprisingly, this
issue has spurred a great deal of debate and controversy
in the French Senate.
As mentioned earlier, the initial proposal by Claeys
and Leonetti, that was passed by an overwhelming ma-
jority at the stages of the first and second reading in the
Assemblée, stated that continuous deep sedation would
always be accompanied by the withdrawing or withholding
of all life sustaining treatments. In an official rapport of
the Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifi-
ques et technologiques (OPECTS), Leonetti remarked:
When administering sedation in the terminal phase,
does it have to be accompanied by a withholding of all
life sustaining treatments? Alain Claeys and myself
think it does. Because-pardon the boldness of my
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comparison-you do not at the same time hit the break
and the accelerator ([28], p. 68: authors’ translation).
In view of the fact that the initial proposal explicitly
stated that ANH constitutes treatment, it diverges from
several sedation guidelines, which emphasise that any
decision to withdraw or withhold ANH should be separ-
ate from the decision whether or not to sedate. Indeed,
according to most guidelines, ANH may be continued if
there is a reason to do so (for example, for medical rea-
sons, a request from the patient, etc.) [15]. It has been
argued that combining sedation and withholding ANH
changes the nature of the act and makes it more prob-
lematic from an ethical point of view (see, for example,
Holm 2013, [22] who argues that sedation without ANH
is often disproportionate for in such cases an interven-
tion is possible that achieves the same effect (symptom
relief ) while posing less risk of life shortening, namely
sedation with ANH). Most likely, the requirement that
nutrition and hydration should be withheld serves the
purpose of not prolonging life, since the goal of con-
tinuous deep sedation as defined in the legislative
proposal is to 'not unnecessarily prolong the patient’s
life' (see above). However, whether or not ANH is
medically futile is not, in our view, settled by refer-
ence to an incurable illness, a short life expectancy,
and refractory suffering, as the proposal suggests. In-
stead, the decision not to provide ANH seems to
imply the moral claim that life is no longer worth
prolonging, rather than the medical claim that hydra-
tion and nutrition are medically futile.
As mentioned above, the statement that ANH consti-
tutes treatment was twice amended in the French Senate
to become the statement that artificial hydration does
not constitute treatment, but instead constitutes care
that could be maintained until death. Continuing to pro-
vide nutrition and hydration should thus, according to
most Senators, not be seen as therapeutic obstinacy. The
current proposal, as approved after the second reading
in the Senate, states that all life sustaining treatment is
withheld by default, unless the patient objects. This
means that even if ANH is considered a life sustaining
treatment, it could still be administered if the patient
objects to its withdrawal. However, in this proposal the
decision to stop all life sustaining treatments is still
automatically tied to the decision to sedate, and it is left
up to the patient to object. If the patient does not object,
there is no option for the physician to decide to con-
tinue life sustaining treatment should she believe it ne-
cessary to do so.
Naturally, the issue of whether or not ANH is a treat-
ment to be withheld or care to be continued has rele-
vance beyond the context of continuous deep sedation.
It was also the topic of another recent and fierce debate
in France, regarding the situation of Vincent Lambert
who was in a permanent vegetative state. Lambert’s wife
and several of his brothers wanted to have ANH with-
drawn, believing this to be in accordance with his wishes
when conscious. Vincent Lambert's parents, one sister
and one half-brother, however, believed that ANH had
to be maintained. After much legal debate the case was
brought before the European Court of Human Rights,
which judged that countries are allowed to adopt regula-
tion to withdraw or withhold ANH in certain specified
circumstances.
Similar to the debate regarding the Claeys and
Leonetti proposal, part of the debate on the Lambert
case revolved around the issue of whether or not ANH
can be considered to be a treatment. According to
Lambert's wife, his physician, and six of his eight
brothers and sisters, it is indeed a treatment and its
continuation could be considered to be therapeutic
obstinacy in view of Lambert's medical condition. For
Lambert's parents, however, providing food and fluids
represents basic care and continuing ANH should
therefore not be considered as therapeutic obstinacy.
If they were right, then the withdrawal could not be
justified under the Loi Leonetti.
As the intense debate surrounding the legislative pro-
posal of Claeys and Leonetti demonstrates, this issue is
far from settled. Whether ANH represents care or treat-
ment still divides the French public and its representa-
tives. In relation to continuous deep sedation, we believe
it is necessary to separate the decision to stop ANH
from the decision to sedate. Moreover, we would submit
that seeing ANH as only treatment is as problematic as
seeing it as purely care. Labelling ANH as treatment
runs the risk of portraying the decision to maintain or
withdraw it as a purely medical decision. As some com-
mentators have noted, however, nutrition and hydration
are only rarely medically futile [22]. If it keeps a patient
alive, it serves that purpose, and 'if withdrawal gives rise
to symptoms, then continuation is clearly not futile, be-
cause it would prevent those symptoms from occurring'
([22], p.233).
The decision to stop artificial hydration and nutrition
often seems to be in accordance with the French pro-
posal’s goal ‘to not unnecessarily prolong the patient’s
life’ [7]. It is crucial, however, not to invoke the fact that
a patient is deeply and continuously sedated as a reason
to withhold or withdraw ANH, since this is a ‘salami-
slicing technique’ [29] to justify the latter decision
merely by reference to a (sedated) state that one has
created oneself. A decision to withhold or withdraw
ANH can be perfectly justified in many cases, for ex-
ample by referring to a patient’s request or her per-
sonal and moral convictions, but it remains a
decision with a significant ethical dimension.
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On the other hand, portraying ANH as care ignores the
fact that its administration does involve a medical proced-
ure (e.g., feeding tubes or intravenous administration). If a
right to refuse treatments is grounded in a patient's funda-
mental right to refuse unwanted bodily invasions, this
may also extend to ANH. Indeed, many of the procedures
for administering ANH are the same as those used
for interventions that are uncontroversially classified
as 'treatment'. Admittedly, despite similarities in the
procedure of administration, ANH is seen by many
commentators as different in nature from medical treat-
ments [30]. However, even if this is the case, ANH still
involves a bodily invasion and could therefore be incon-
sistent with a patient’s right to bodily integrity if the pa-
tient refuses, or, when no longer competent, has refused
ANH in advance.
In our view, the question as to whether ANH consti-
tutes medical treatment or medical care is not the most
important one to be addressed, and distracts from the
more fundamental issue of whether or not ANH can be
justifiably withdrawn or withheld in individual cases and
what circumstances might justify such a withdrawing or
withholding. We believe ANH can in some cases be jus-
tifiably withheld or withdrawn. However, in our view,
withholding or withdrawing ANH for continuously se-
dated patients at the end of life is only rarely justified on
medical grounds, and should therefore not be portrayed
as a purely medical decision. It should be inspired by
and based on the wishes and moral and/or religious con-
victions of patients and/or their relatives, and for this
reason it should always be considered on a case-by-case
basis. As rightly noted by geriatrician Gillian Craig:
Staff who believe strongly that intravenous fluids are
inappropriate should not impose their views on (…)
relatives who request that a dying patient be given
intravenous fluids to prevent dehydration or thirst.
To overrule such a request is, in my view, ethically
wrong. The only proviso would be if the patient
had, when compos mentis, specifically said that he/
she did not want a drip under any circumstances. No
relatives should be forced to watch a loved one die
while medical staff insist on withholding hydration. (…)
Such an experience is deeply disturbing and could
haunt a person forever. Is all this agony worth it
for the sake of avoiding a drip? (…) The converse
also applies. There will be occasions when the
medical staff who are professionally involved would
like to use a drip, but a knowledgeable relative
requests no intervention. In this situation, the medical
team will need to make a carefully balanced judgement
as to whether intervention is essential or not. (…) Care
must be taken to ensure that the burden of bereavement
is not loaded heavily by distress about patient
management in the terminal phase ([31], p. 142–3:
references omitted).
Therefore, a requirement that ANH should always be
withheld when continuous deep sedation is administered
to a patient is overly strict and unjustifiably ignores the
ethical component of decisions to stop ANH. A policy
that ANH could never be withheld or withdrawn is
equally problematic, however, as this would ignore the
fact that some people may have justified personal, moral
or religious reasons for refusing it.
Moreover, giving patients the possibility to decide
whether or not to forego life sustaining treatments and
ANH also seems to be in accordance with what was ini-
tially stated to be one of the goals of the proposal,
namely strengthening patients’ decisional authority [28].
During the legislative process, Leonetti, for example,
remarked:
[the proposal] also [concerns] a right of a patient who
is most vulnerable because he is at the end of his life
and who has the right to ask not to suffer. If there is
no other alternative [than CDS] one can legitimately
resort to it ([28], p. 68: authors’ translation).
In a similar vein, Jean Claude Ameisen, president of
the Comité Consultatif National d’Ethique, observed that
the new legislation is a response to a particular problem:
[currently], paradoxically, when a patient is conscious
and able to express himself, the request for deep
sedation is subject to the authority of the physician’s
decision. When a patient is at the end of life or when
his treatments are withheld, his request to be able to
sleep until death should impose itself on the carers
and not be subject to the authority of the physician
([28], p. 40: authors’ translation and emphasis).
However, if ANH is withdrawn by definition (as was
specified in the original proposal) or if life sustaining
treatments are withdrawn by default unless the patient
objects (as mentioned in the most recent amendment of
the proposal), the patient’s decisional authority is in fact,
we would argue, quite limited.
Why ignore the severity or (un)bearability of suffering?
Apart from its stance on continuous deep sedation and
ANH, the original French legislative proposal differs
significantly from international guidelines in one other
respect. Many guidelines on continuous deep sedation
recommend that it should only be used in patients who
are suffering intolerably from treatment refractory symp-
toms [15, 26]. Although the French legal proposal states
that continuous deep sedation should only be initiated
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for treatment refractory suffering, it does not require
this suffering to be severe or unbearable.
Not explicitly including severity or unbearableness of
the suffering as a criterion for receiving continuous deep
sedation has serious consequences, since refractoriness
does not necessarily presuppose severe or unbearable suf-
fering. We believe there are two important reasons for in-
cluding severity and unbearableness as a condition for
obtaining continuous deep sedation. First, taking away a
patient’s consciousness is a grave matter that can only be
justified for proportionally grave reasons. We would sub-
mit that the presence of treatment refractory suffering
does not provide a sufficiently grave reason. This condi-
tion can only be met when the suffering is also severe and
unbearable. The original French legislative proposal would
allow patients with a grave and incurable illness to request
and receive continuous deep sedation for suffering which,
while treatment refractory, is relatively mild. Granted, in
view of the fact that, according to the proposal, con-
tinuous deep sedation is only indicated for patients
who request it, who suffer from serious and incurable
illness, and who have a short life expectancy, requests
for deep sedation for mild suffering would most likely
be rare. Nevertheless, in legislative documents non-
explicit criteria are essentially non-existent and thus
non-enforceable criteria. Including a criterion regard-
ing the severity and unbearableness of the suffering
would foreclose the possibility of requesting deep sed-
ation for mild and tolerable suffering.
Second, omitting a criterion regarding the severity and
unbearableness of the suffering shifts the focus from a
patient-centered criterion (bearableness) to a purely
physician-centered medical criterion (refractoriness).
The danger here is that the patient’s voice and his or her
appreciation of the situation might be ignored or under-
valued. The current proposal might, also in this respect,
overly limit patients’ autonomy by excluding the patient
from decision-making on what levels of suffering he or
she finds bearable and what he or she is willing to trade-
off for pain relief.
However, it seems that refractoriness was initially
intended to be a patient centred criterion. When
explaining his proposal, Leonetti remarked:
Who decides whether suffering is refractory? The
physician or the patient? I have a slight tendency to
think that regarding something so fundamentally
subjective, even when we have precise criteria for
determining current suffering, it is nevertheless the
patient who decides that suffering is refractory
([28], p. 67: authors’ translation).
However, this does not seem to be in line with the way
in which the term ‘refractory’ is commonly used, viz.:
not or no longer responsive to currently available
treatments. Indeed, while severity and bearableness
are subjective and can only be judged by a patient,
determining whether medical alternatives are available
and, if so, which ones, requires medical knowledge.
Hence the physician is best suited to judge refractori-
ness. Moreover, the fact that the French proposal
states that refractoriness can be also judged in pa-
tients unable to express their wish, suggests that the
proposal sees the patient’s voice as non-essential in
determining refractoriness.
Therefore, if the goal is to include the patient’s voice, a
strong argument can be made for explicitly including se-
verity or unbearableness of the suffering as a criterion.
Such a criterion gives patients the right to decide for
themselves how they would balance relief of suffering
against, for example, alertness at the end of life or other
personal, moral or religious values. Moreover, such a
criterion creates an obligation on behalf of a patient
requesting continuous deep sedation to convince the
treating physicians that the suffering he or she experi-
ences is indeed severe and unbearable, which in turn can
enable a patient-physician discussion on levels of suffer-
ing and different ways to address these.
Does the stipulation of a right to continuous deep
sedation aim to avoid the decriminalisation of
euthanasia?
Another topic of fierce debate that erupted in relation to
the French legislative proposal is the relationship be-
tween continuous deep sedation on the one hand and
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the other
hand. The legislative proposal attracted considerable
criticism from right-to-die organisations for allegedly
using the legalisation of continuous deep sedation as a
way to avoid having to decriminalise physician-assisted
suicide [32].
This criticism was fuelled by the fact that the legisla-
tive proposal was a direct consequence of President
Hollande’s promise to legalise ‘medical assistance in
dying’ (as mentioned above). Hence, what many had
interpreted as a promise to decriminalise physician-
assisted suicide (but was actually less specific) they saw
as eventually being turned into a proposal of a legal
framework for continuous deep sedation, much to the
discontentment of those in favour of physician-assisted
suicide. CDS, they claimed, was already made legal by
the Loi Leonetti (as was confirmed in the Sicard report),
so they considered the creation of an explicit legal right
to CDS as no more than smoke and mirrors to distract
from the fact that euthanasia and physician-assisted sui-
cide remain illegal in France.
Three elements need stressing in this regard. First, the
legislative proposal would create a novel patient right to
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obtain continuous deep sedation under specific condi-
tions and would thus go beyond what was already expli-
citly legal. Second, although interpreted by many as a
promise to decriminalise physician-assisted suicide,
François Hollande's actual commitment was less specific.
In some respects, continuous deep sedation could be
interpreted as a form of 'medical assistance to end one's
life with dignity', thus fulfilling the commitment. Third,
although no proposal to legalise physician-assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia is being considered by the French
Parliament, these options have been discussed and de-
bated to some extent. The activities of the Sicard task-
force resulted in an extensive report examining and
rejecting the possibility to decriminalise euthanasia and/
or physician-assisted suicide. Moreover, the National
Advisory Committee on Ethics of France has issued an
advice showing that the majority of its members
favoured creating an explicit right to request continuous
deep sedation, while rejecting the decriminalisation of
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide [33].
While some commentators suggest that a right to con-
tinuous deep sedation was proposed in order to avoid
having to decriminalise physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia, others believe the legislative proposal is
actually a disguised way to allow medically assisted
life shortening. During the Senate debates, it became
clear that many Senators considered the creation of a
legal right to continuous deep sedation as nothing
more than a first step on the road to the decriminal-
isation of physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. For
this reason, continuous deep sedation was labelled a
'Trojan horse' [12].
In some respects, this confirms the claim made by
Battin [1] that continuous deep sedation often consti-
tutes an inadequate compromise [34]: for some propo-
nents of assisted dying, continuous deep sedation fails to
adequately respect patient autonomy and is not indi-
cated in all cases in which assisted dying might be indi-
cated [35], whereas for some opponents of euthanasia,
some forms of continuous deep sedation (for example
CDS without ANH) could be considered as potentially
crossing the border into ethically dubious or unaccept-
able practices [22]. In short, by missing the opportunity
to create clarity on continuous deep sedation, the French
legislative initiative has actually resulted in a further
polarisation of the debate between proponents and op-
ponents of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.
Debating continuous deep sedation together with
medically-assisted dying involves considerable risks. If
enacting an explicit right to this practice is indeed a dis-
guised way to decriminalise euthanasia or physician-
assisted dying, then it is intellectually dishonest. If, in-
stead, the aim of creating a right to continuous deep
sedation is to avoid decriminalising medically-assisted
dying, this poses risks of its own. As noted by Battin
(2008):
[O]ur anxiety that [sedation] may be confused with
euthanasia encourages us to obscure or sanitize the
features both practices share ([1], p.29).
Conclusions
France is currently in the midst of a fierce debate on
what constitutes a dignified end of life and which prac-
tices are acceptable for physicians to perform. At the
very core of the debate is the practice of continuous
deep sedation. As argued in this paper, what is playing
out is a unique opportunity to clarify the legality of con-
tinuous deep sedation as an end-of-life practice. Recog-
nizing continuous deep sedation as a sui generis practice
could remove the need to portray the practice either as
symptom control or as a form of euthanasia. This might
make it less difficult to focus on the issues that are most
relevant and pertinent to continuous deep sedation.
However, there are still various issues of significant
ethical concern in the French legislative proposal. Auto-
matically withholding artificial nutrition and hydration is
in our view overly strict and unjustifiably equates artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration with medical treatment. As
argued above, there is also danger in seeing it as care
that can never be withdrawn. Focussing only on the
question as to whether ANH should be seen as just an-
other treatment or as fundamental basic care seems to
ignore the most crucial question, i.e., in what circum-
stances it may justifiably be withdrawn or withheld.
Second, by not limiting the right to continuous deep
sedation to patients with severe or unbearable suffering,
the French proposal leaves open the possibility to re-
quest continuous deep sedation for mild and bearable
suffering. In our view, continuous deep sedation is a far
reaching practice that can only be justified by reference
to an ethical principle of proportionality. However,
this ethical justification can only apply to those cases
where suffering is both refractory and very severe or
unbearable.
Finally, the debates in France demonstrate that dis-
cussing continuous deep sedation often also raises the
issues of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia. Op-
ponents of physician-assisted suicide might see continu-
ous deep sedation as a first step on the slippery slope.
Others object to the focus on continuous sedation as an
excuse to ignore the most pressing issues at the end of
life. Continuous deep sedation then proves to be an un-
acceptable compromise to both proponents and oppo-
nents of euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide.
Moreover, a failure to recognize sedation as a sui generis
practice and attempts to portray the practice as either
similar or dissimilar from medically assisted dying risks
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ignoring patients’ actual interests in having a peaceful
and dignified end of life.
We believe France’s attempt to reflect on continuous
deep sedation as a practice that needs clarification pro-
vides an interesting example. Most importantly, continu-
ous deep sedation should not be seen as a catch all
solution to ethical issues at the end of life, for it is not
the automatically preferable alternative it is sometimes
portrayed to be [35]. As mentioned above, in France the
fear exists that the attempt to legalise continuous deep
sedation is fuelled by a desire to avoid debates about eu-
thanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide. In our view,
this would be a misguided motivation to create a legal
framework for continuous deep sedation. On the other
hand, in view of the lack of clarity regarding the legal
status of continuous deep sedation, there seem to be
good reasons to reflect about ways to render uniform
the acceptable conditions for initiating it. This need not
necessarily involve creating a specific law as is being de-
veloped in France. In The Netherlands, for example, a
widely followed national guideline on sedation exists
with potential disciplinary ramifications in case of non-
compliance. Regardless of the specific regulatory re-
sponse that is opted for, reflection and decision-making
by professional medical bodies as well as public policy-
makers about when and how continuous deep sedation
is acceptable might provide the necessary clarity where
it is now often lacking.
Endnotes
1Hollande’s commitments can still be found online at
http://www.ps29.org/IMG/pdf/Projet_FH2012.pdf.
2Original text: «à bénéficier d’une assistance médicalisée
pour terminer sa vie dans la dignité.»
3Original text: «À la demande du patient d'éviter toute
souffrance et de ne pas prolonger inutilement sa vie, une
sédation profonde et continue provoquant une altération
de la conscience maintenue jusqu'au décès, associée à
une analgésie et à l'arrêt de l'ensemble des traitements
de maintien en vie », est mise en œuvre dans les cas
suivants :
1. Lorsque le patient atteint d'une affection grave et
incurable et dont le pronostic vital est engagé à
court terme présente une souffrance réfractaire au
traitement;
2. Lorsque la décision du patient atteint d'une affection
grave et incurable d'arrêter un traitement engage son
pronostic vital à court terme».
4Original text: «La nutrition et l'hydratation artificielles
constituent un traitement».
5Original text: «L'hydratation artificielle constitue un
soin qui peut être maintenu jusqu'en fin de vie».
6Original text: « La nutrition et l’hydratation artificielles
constituent des traitements qui peuvent être arrêtés »
7Original text : « À la demande du patient d’éviter
toute souffrance et de ne pas subir d’obstination
déraisonnable, une sédation profonde et continue
provoquant une altération de la conscience maintenue
jusqu’au décès, associée à une analgésie et à l’arrêt de
l’ensemble des traitements de maintien en vie, est
mise en œuvre dans les cas suivants :
1. Lorsque le patient atteint d’une affection grave et
incurable et dont le pronostic vital est engagé à
court terme présente une souffrance réfractaire aux
traitements;
2. Lorsque la décision du patient atteint d’une affection
grave et incurable d’arrêter un traitement engage
son pronostic vital à court terme et est susceptible
d’entraîner une souffrance insupportable.
8The Dutch Public Prosecutor has officially declared
that he sees no reason to prosecute a physician perform-
ing continuous sedation if the Dutch National guideline
is respected.
9Moreover, this confusion does not only exist in
Belgium, but also in The Netherlands [36]. There is
no reason to assume that this confusion would be
any less in other countries, including countries that
have not depenalised euthanasia and/or physician-
assisted suicide.
Abbreviations
ANH: artificial nutrition and hydration; CDS: continuous deep sedation at the
end of life; CSP: Code de la Santé Publique; OPECTS: Office parlementaire
d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques; PAS: physician
assisted suicide.
Acknowledgements
Not applicable.
Funding
KR has as postdoc scholarship at Ghent University. KC is Postdoctoral Fellow
of the Research Foundation Flanders and SS is a professor at Ghent
University. This research is not part of a funded research project, so there
was no specific research funding.
Availability of data and materials
This paper is based on publicly available data and materials. For this paper
we made use of articles published in international journals, to be found on,
for example PubMed. We also made use of the preparatory works of the
French Assemblée Nationale and French Senate, all of which can be found
online at http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/ppl14-348.html#timeline-7.
Authors’ contributions
All authors were involved in creating this manuscript. KR took the lead in
writing various drafts. KC and SS provided extensive comments on each draft
and helped write the final manuscript. All authors read and approved the
final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interest.
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Raus et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:36 Page 9 of 10
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Received: 7 October 2015 Accepted: 16 May 2016
References
1. Battin MP. Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes. Hastings
Cent Rep. 2008;38:27–30.
2. Sterckx S, Raus K, Mortier F, editors. Continuous Sedation at the End of Life.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
3. Daly P. Palliative Sedation, Foregoing Life-Sustaining Treatment, and Aid-in-
Dying: What Is the Difference? Theor Med Bioeth. 2015;36:197–213.
4. ten Have H, Welie JVM. Palliative Sedation Versus Euthanasia: An Ethical
Assessment. J Pain Symptom Manag. 2014;47:123–6.
5. Materstvedt LJ. Intention, Procedure, Outcome and Personhood in Palliative
Sedation and Euthanasia. BMJ Support Palliat Care. 2012;2:9–11.
6. Billings A, Block SD. Slow euthanasia. J Palliat Care. 1996;12:21–30.
7. Assemblée Nationale. Proposition de Loi créant de nouveaux droits en faveur
des malades et des personnes en fin de vie, Nr 2512. 2015. http://www.
assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion2512.asp. Accessed 6 Oct 2015
8. Raus K, Mortier F, Sterckx S. Is Continuous Sedation at the End of Life an
Ethically Preferable Alternative to Physician-Assisted Suicide? Am J Bioeth.
2011;11:32–40.
9. Loi n° 2005–370 du 22 avril 2005 relative aux droits des malades et à la fin
de vie. Journal Officiel. 2005;59:7089.
10. Huxtable R, Horn R. Continuous deep sedation at the end of life: balancing
benefits and harms in England, Germany and France. In: Sterckx S, Raus K,
Mortier F, editors. Continuous Sedation at the End of Life. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; 2013. p. 160–76.
11. Commission de Reflexion sur la Fin de Vie en France. Penser solidairement
la fin de vie. 2012. http://www.social-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport-de-la-
commission-de-reflexion-sur-la-fin-de-vie-en-France.pdf. Accessed 6 Oct. 2015.
12. Sénat. Session ordinaire de 2015–2016: 29 octobre 2015. Proposition de loi
créant de nouveaux droits pour les personnes malades en fin de vie. 2015
13. Tännsjö T, editor. Terminal sedation: euthanasia in disguise? Dordrecht:
Kluwer; 2004.
14. Seymour J, Rietjens JAC, Bruinsma S, Deliens L, Sterckx S, Mortier F, et al.
Using continuous sedation until death for cancer patients: a qualitative
interview study of physicians’ and nurses’ practice in three European
countries. Palliat Med. 2015;29:48–59.
15. KNMG (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij ter bevordering van de
Geneeskunde). KNMG-Guideline for palliative sedation. 2009. http://knmg.
artsennet.nl/Publicaties/KNMGpublicatie/Guideline-for-palliative-sedation-
2009.htm. Accessed 6 Oct. 2015.
16. Belgian Senate. Advice of the Council of State. Document number 2-244/21.
2001. http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?COLL=S&LANG=nl&LEG=
2&MIval=/publications/viewPub.html&NR=244&VOLGNR=21. Accessed
6 Oct 2015.
17. Smets T, Bilsen J, Cohen J, Rurup ML, Mortier F, Deliens L. Reporting of
euthanasia in medical practice in Flanders, Belgium: cross sectional analysis
of reported and unreported cases. Brit Med J. 2010;341:c5174.
18. Anquinet L, Raus K, Sterckx S, Smets T, Deliens L, Rietjens JAC. Continuous
sedation until death not always strictly distinguished from euthanasia. A
focus group study in Flanders, Belgium. Palliat Med. 2013;27:553–61.
19. Chambaere K, Bernheim J, Downar J, Deliens L. Characteristics of Belgian
‘life-ending acts without explicit patient request’: a large-scale death
certificate survey revisited. CMAJ Open. 2014;2:E262–7.
20. Sykes N, Thorns A. Sedative Use in the Last Week of Life and the Implications
for End-of-Life Decision Making. Arch Intern Med. 2003;163:341–4.
21. Janssens R, van Delden JJM, Widdershoven GAM. Palliative Sedation: Not
Just Normal Medical Practice. Ethical Reflections on the Royal Dutch
Medical Association’s Guideline on Palliative Sedation. J Med Ethic.
2012;38:664–8.
22. Holm S. Terminal sedation and euthanasia: the virtue in calling a spade
what it is. In: Sterckx S, Raus K, Mortier F, editors. Continuous Sedation at
the End of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013. p. 228–39.
23. Raus K, Sterckx S, Mortier F. Can the doctrine of double effect justify
continuous deep sedation at the end of life? In: Sterckx S, Raus K, Mortier F,
editors. Continuous Sedation at the End of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 2013. p. 177–201.
24. Delbeke E. The legal permissibility of continuous deep sedation at the end
of life: a comparison of laws and a proposal. In: Sterckx S, Raus K, Mortier F,
editors. Continuous Sedation at the End of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 2013. p. 132–48.
25. American Medical Association. Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion 2.211 -
Physician-Assisted Suicide. 2008. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page?.
Accessed 6 Oct 2015.
26. Cherny NI, Radbruch L. European Association for Palliative Care (EAPC)
recommended framework for the use of sedation in palliative care. Palliat
Med. 2009;23:581–93.
27. Schildmann E, Schildmann J. Palliative sedation therapy: a systematic review
and critical appraisal of available guidance on indication and decision-
making. J Palliat Med. 2014;17:601–11.
28. Office Parlementaire d’Evaluation des Choix Scientifiques et Techniques.
Rapport. 5 mars 2015.
29. van Delden JJM. Terminal sedation: source of a restless ethical debate.
J Med Ethic. 2007;33:187–8.
30. Tollefsen C, editor. Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The New Catholic
Debate. Dordrecht: Springer; 2008.
31. Craig GM. On Withholding Nutrition and Hydration in the Terminally Ill: Has
Palliative Medicine Gone Too Far? J Med Ethic. 1994;20:139–43.
32. Association pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité. Communiqué du 5 juin
2015 : La Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme a rendu sa décision : la
volonté de Vincent Lambert devra être respectée. 2015. http://www.admd.
net/communique-du-5-juin-2015-la-cour-europeenne-des-droits-de-
lhomme-a-rendu-sa-decision-la-volonte-de-vincent-lambert-devra-etre-
respectee. Accessed 6 Oct 2015
33. Comité Consultatif National d’Ethique. Avis no 121: Fin de vie, autonomie
de la personne, volonté de mourir. 2013. http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/sites/
default/files/publications/avis_121_0.pdf. Accessed 6 Oct 2015
34. Jansen LA, Sulmasy DP. Sedation, Alimentation, Hydration, and Equivocation:
Careful Conversation about Care at the End of Life. Ann Intern Med.
2002;136:845–9.
35. Lossignol D. End-of-Life Sedation: Is There an Alternative? Curr Opin Oncol.
2015;27:358–64.
36. Buiting H, van der Heide A, Onwuteaka-Philipsen B, Rurup ML, Rietjens JAC,
Borsboom G, et al. Physicians’ Labelling of End-of-Life Practices: A Hypothetical
Case Study. J Med Ethic. 2010;36:24–9.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Raus et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2016) 17:36 Page 10 of 10
